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Sartre, Nausea: the only philosophical novel 
 
by John Shand 
The Open University 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s Nausea is undoubtedly a work of genius. By genius is meant something 
that combines startling originality and magnificent execution. But it is even more than that. It 
is the only truly philosophical novel. This might seem an outrageous claim. Surely other 
novels have philosophical content and implications. Quite a few novels at the very least touch 
on philosophical matters such as ethics or politics. Some novels indeed have people in them 
explicitly discussing philosophy. But only Nausea has the core of philosophy, matters of 
epistemology and metaphysics, and the full range of its other key concerns, embedded in and 
expressed through what happens. Philosophical ideas are explicated in the very content and 
narrative of the novel itself. No other novel could stand as a good introduction to the subject 
of philosophy. What in a work of philosophy is expressed as ideas in sentences and 
arguments, are, in Nausea, exemplified in things that are described and occur. Philosophy 
itself is shown, not said. It is philosophy reified. 
Through the device of the fictitious diary of Antoine Roquentin, what happens to him, 
what he experiences, with some judicious reflections, Sartre lays out a philosophical view, 
and shows how other classic proposed philosophical views fall apart or founder. The world is 
absolutely contingent. Each thing is superfluous. There is in the end nothing to keep it in any 
recognisable governed order. There is nothing either that we can look to to decide for us how 
we should live our lives. The ‘nausea’ the title alludes to this giddying, head-spinning, 
sickening sense of lack of order, like a room suddenly starting to spin around you. The order 
we think the world has, the way it divides itself up into different sorts of things that then 
change in predictable ways, is an illusion. Similarly, the way in which we may think that we 
are constrained in the things that we choose, so that we can pass on responsibility for our 
choices to something other than ourselves, is a chimera. To live as if we do not have in fact 
complete freedom of will, by which we alone choose what and who we are, is to live in ‘bad 
faith’, or ‘inauthentically’ – it is to live a lie – it is to lie to ourselves that who and what we 
are is not something we are responsible for. 
 Sartre does not argue these points in the course of Nausea; rather, they are simply 
shown as literal truths. While Roquentin is sitting on a tram, the way we neatly conceptualise 
the world breaks down. The seat in front of him becomes the upturned belly of a rotting 
donkey. When he picks up a stone, his senses become conflated – it does not feel hard, rather 
he senses sweetness. In the park, finally, climactically and catastrophically, all conceptual 
identity whereby things are certain sorts, which order them to behave in certain ways, 
evaporates totally, and we are left with pure existence; so that before, what were the roots of 
a tree become an ineffable, disgusting, indigestible lump of contingent unclassified being. 
This is the Humean nightmare, where our lack of sureness from one second to the next of 
what is going to happen, that a hammer for all we know might transmogrify into a butterfly, 
becomes a reality. Kant’s categories, paraded as transcendental, as necessary, and there to 
dispel the Humean nightmare by imposing order on appearances, are revealed to be just 
contingent psychological concepts that have no ability to order reality itself as pure brute 
existence. Plato’s forms are no use either, as even though they are necessary and eternal, and 
forever ordered, they are transcendent, beyond and outside the world of things that exist and 
can impose no order on their gross being. In the café, a jazz record is smashed – the music 
itself exists in a world of pure Platonic forms – the record is lost, but not the music. But such 
a world for all its necessity has no power to impose any order, let alone any necessity, on 
brute contingent existence. 
 We are in fact not only free, but forced to be free. Why do one thing rather than 
another then? Why live one life rather than another? Does one life make more sense than 
another? For Sartre, as for Roquentin, on one level the answer is no. However, the worst one 
can be is be like the waiter in the café. He’s lazily minded, and because it is easy, removes all 
the fear of choosing what to be, what kind of life to have, by identifying himself as a waiter – 
thus he does what a waiter does, he is a waiter – few choices then need be made, the burden is 
lifted as to how to live your life. But in fact he could choose to live a different life, but tells 
himself, lies to himself, that he must by some kind of necessity be a waiter and thus act as 
one. This makes him a coward who is unwilling to face up to his own freedom, that we are 
the absolute formers of ourselves, what we do and what we are – we always have a choice 
whatever the facticity  circumstances. Even when we face the firing squad we can choose to 
die bravely or as a coward. The best one can do is at least face up to the truth of the 
absolutely contingency of one’s own life and take full responsibility for what one chooses. 
  Roquentin himself looks at his own life; but not only looks; he acts out what he 
thinks, and thus shows what he thinks. We tell ourselves stories about our life – we form it 
into a narrative in our minds so as to give it shape. But really it has no shape, or point, or 
order in a sense external to ourselves. Existence precedes essence. Things are; they have 
brute indeterminate existence. Things only become what they are through our engagement 
with them in the world. In our own case is up to us alone to determine what we are through 
what we do. 
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